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Ward v. French
No. 98-7, 1998 WL 743664
(4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998)
I Facts'
On April 3, 1991, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Dorothy Mae Smith
("Smith") closed the convenience store she owned with her husband in
Greenville, North Carolina.2 She began walking home, carryin approxi-
mately $4,000 in cash, some checks, and a few personal items. Shortly
thereafter, Smith's neighbor, Lonnie Daniels ("Daniels"), heard five gun-
shots.4 Daniels and a friend went over to Smith's house and found her lying
on the ground near the back door, bleeding and unresponsive.' Smith died
later from the wounds." The autopsy revealed that Smith had been shot five
times by small caliber guns fired from a distance no greater than three or
four feet
David Junior Ward ("Ward") was arrested on April 4 for an unrelated
incident! Following his apprehension, Ward made an oral statement
regarding the murder of Smith and, later, a consistent written statement.9
In his statements, Ward implicated Wesley Harris ("Harris"), as well as
himself, in the Smith murder."0 With Ward's assistance, the police located
Harris, the weapons used in the attack on Smith, and the proceeds of the
robbery."
1. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at 165 F.3d 22 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. Ward v. French, No. 98-7, 1998 WL 743664, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998).






9. Id The oral statement was reduced to writing by a detective and is reproduced in
its entirety in the court's opinion. Of particular interest is the fact that both men were in




Ward was subsequently convicted of numerous charges, including first-
degree murder. 2 The jury recommended that Ward receive the death
penalty for the murder conviction." The jury based its determination on
a finding of the aggravating factor that Ward had murdered Smith for
pecuniary gain and that the mitigating circumstances it found were insuffi-
cient to outweigh the aggravating factor."4
Ward's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina and the United States Supreme Court." After unsuccess-
fully pursuing state habeas relief, Ward filed a federal habeas action in
district court and was denied relief. 6 Ward appealed on numerous grounds
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
II. Holding
The court of appeals held that all of Ward's claims either lacked merit
or were procedurally barred.'7
12. Id. Under North Carolina law, first degree murder is capital murder. In addition,
there is no triggerman statute in North Carolina. All people involved in the murder may be
charged with first degree/capital murder, subject, of course, to the constitutional sentencing
limitations imposed by Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that certain accomplices may not be sentenced to death).
13. Id
14. Id. The jury found the following mitigating circumstances: (1) that Ward had aided
in the a pprehension of a capital felon; (2) that Ward had confessed guilt and cooperated with
law enforcement officers; and (3) that it was not proven which firearm Ward had used. Id
15. Id, at *2.
16. Id
17. Id., at *10. A number of Ward's claims will not be discussed at length in this
summary because they either turned on facts specific to the case, were decided in a cursory
manner, or were procedurally defaulted. The first of these is Ward's contention that the
statutory power of the district attorney to schedule cases for trial in a way that permits judge-
shopping violates due process. Id. The facial challenge failed, for Ward failed to point to
relevant United States Supreme Court precedent to support his claim that this power is
.contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law."
Id (citing Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998) (clarifying the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act standard of review)). Although this challenge failed, the
situation is a reminder that, to a lesser degree, defense counsel are also able to engage in judge-
shopping and should do so.
Ward also raised two claims related to jury selection. Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *3.
Citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985), the court dismissed Ward's claim that
the trial court erroneously excused for cause potential jurors on the basis that their opposi-
tion to the death penalty would prevent them from applying the law. Ward, 1998 WL
743664, at *3. Also, citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986), the court denied
Ward's allegation that the process of excluding potential jurors under Wainwright made the
jury more likely to convict and, therefore, deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair
trial. Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *4.
Next, Ward objected to the prosecuting attorney's placement of the victim's husband
near the prosecution's table and in view of the jury. Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *3 (noting
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that Mr. Smith began to cry audibly and left the courtroom during the opening arguments).
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had reasonably rejected this claim since there
is no Supreme Court authority for Ward's position. Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *4. There
are some strategic options available to defense counsel to protect the defendant from this type
of situation, including a pretrial motion that each party be responsible for controlling their
witnesses. This motion will not result in the exclusion of the victim's family but it forces the
prosecution to be responsible for the conduct of its witnesses, which may be helpful later on
in the trial. Another effective strategy may be for defense counsel to bring in the defendant's
family and place them in the front row, as well, alerting the jury to the fact that the defendant
also has a family.
The court dismissed Ward's challenge to the prosecution's argument concerning his
refusal to testify at Harris's trial because the juryfound the statutory mitigating factor that
Ward had "aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified truthfully on behalf
of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony." Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *6
(quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(8) (1988)).
Ward also contended that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding his
abuse of drugs and inability to remember the night of the murder was error. Ward, 1998 WL
743664, at *6. The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed that the exclusion of this
testimony was error, but found it to be harmless error. Id The Fourth Circuit upheld this
determination, noting that there was other expert and lay witness testimony about Ward's
history of drug use. Id
The court dismissed Ward's claim that the refusal of the jury to find certain
nonstatutory mitigating factors, despite uncontradicted testimony, rendered his sentence
unconstitutional. Relying on Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 807 (11th Cir. 1984),
the court concluded that the sentencer is not required to agree with the defendant that
specific evidence is mitigating. Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *7.
Ward's contention that he was shackled in view of the jury after a surprise outburst,
in violation of his constitutional rights, was also rejected. Md., at *8. The court found that it
was not clear that restraint, under the circumstances, was not unreasonable. Id See Illinois
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (holding that, in certain, unforeseen situations, "binding
and gagging might possibly [sic] be the fairest and most reasonable way to handle a defen-
dant").
Ward's challenges to the proportionality review conducted by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina were rejected. Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *8. However, of interest to
Virginia practitioners is the court's implicit recognition of a constitutional basis for a
challenge to Virginia's proportionality review under Pulley v. Harris: "The Pulley court
acknowledged the possibility of 'a capital sentencing system so lacking in other checks on
arbitrariness that it would not pass constitutional muster without comparative proportional-
ity review.'" Id, at *8 n.8 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51 (1984); see also Douglas
R. Banghart, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 329 (1999) (analyzing Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d
835 (4th Cir. 1998)).
The following claims were summarily rejected: (1) Ward's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel for failure to develop expert testimony; and (2) Ward's due process challenge to
the failure of the state habeas court to hold an evidentiary hearing. Ward, 1998 WL 743664,
at *8-9.
Lastly, the following three claims were found to be procedurally defaulted: (1) that the
imposition of the death penalty was improperly based on emotion and thus violated the
Eighth Amendment; (2) that the jury viewing Ward in shackles and handcuffs for portions
of the sentencing phase violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; and
(3) that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support a finding that the murder
was committed for pecuniary gain. Id., at *9.
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II. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. A Co-Defendant's Sentence as Mitigating Evidence
Ward argued that the trial court deprived him of his Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence
of Harris's life sentence in mitigation.1" Under Lockett v. Ohio"9 and Eddings
v. Oklahoma, ° the sentencer must not be precluded from considering any
aspect of the defendant's character or record or any circumstance of the
offense offered by the defendant when deciding whether the death penalty
is appropriate.21 The court held that "[e)vidence of the sentence received by
a co-defendant ... is neither an aspect of the defendant's character or record
nor a circumstance of the offense."' Accordingly, it dismissed Ward's
claim.23
While the court is correct in noting the absence of a United States
Supreme Court decision directly holding that it is constitutionally required
that a co-defendant's sentence be considered in mitigation, in fact, there is
no definitive Supreme Court authority either way. In Parker v. Dugger,2"
the Court recognized that Florida law attached mitigating value to the
sentence of a co-defendant." However, the Court gave no opinion on
whether such consideration was constitutionally required. Note also that
in Payne v. Tennessee,26 the Court held that victim impact evidence may be
considered as aggravating evidence.27 Certainly, the reverse argument may
be made for allowing the admission of a co-defendant's sentence. A non-
capital sentence for a co-defendant, especially one with equal or greater
responsibility than that of the defendant's, can be powerful mitigation
evidence. Defense counsel should remember that admission of this evidence
is not prohibited; rather, it is left to the discretion of the trial judge, who
may admit it if he sees fit.
B. District Attorney's Comment on Defendant's Failure to Testify
Ward claimed the district attorney's comments during his closing
arguments regarding Ward's failure to testify violated his Fifth Amendment
18. Id., at *7.
19. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
20. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
21. Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *7 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110
(1982)).
22. Id., at *7 (citing Brogdon v. Blackburn, 790 F.2d 1164, 1169 (5th Cir. 1986)).
23. Id.
24. 498 U.S. 308 (1991).
25. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 313 (1991).
26. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
27. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
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right not to testify.2" Specifically, Ward's claim was based upon the follow-
ing remark made by the district attorney: "I mean, if he knows all this-I
mean, I'd like for him to put a hand on the Bible, take an oath. He had
every opportunity to get up here and tell it, if that is what he knows. He
didn't do it."29 Under Griffin v. California,3" the Constitution forbids both
comments on the defendant's silence by the prosecutor and instructions by
the court that the defendant's silence is suggestive of guilt." Here, the court
looked at the context in which the prosecutor's comments were made and
concluded that Ward's constitutional rights had not been violated."
Apparently, the basis for the ruling was a determination that the
comment was a response to defense counsel's opening statement suggesting
that Ward would testify. Every Griffin violation must, of course, be chal-
lenged. After Ward, however, special care must be taken in opening argu-
ments to refer only to what the "evidence will show" and not to promise,
either explicitly or implicitly, that the evidence will come from a particular
source.
Alix M. Karl
28. Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *4.
29. Ward, 1998 WI 743664, at *4.
30. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
31. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
32. Ward, 1998 WL 743664, at *4 & n.4 (containing text of closing argument).
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